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I. Executive Summary
In March 2010, the FCC released the National Broadband Plan, 
an initiative to dramatically increase broadband access for U.S. 
consumers.  As part of the plan, the FCC articulated a desire to 
reallocate large amounts of electromagnetic spectrum to mobile 
broadband use.  The FCC’s desire to reallocate spectrum from 
existing uses raises significant questions about the rights of the 
existing FCC license holders of that spectrum. 
The largest block of potentially available spectrum that is 
economically and technologically viable to reallocate to mobile 
broadband use is the 294 Mhz allocated to broadcast television. 
Regulators find the potential reallocation of broadcast television 
spectrum appealing insofar as this spectrum is relatively inefficiently 
used.  Approximately 90% of U.S. households do not receive their 
broadcast television programming through the broadcast spectrum, 
but instead from cable, satellite, or an increasing variety of Internet-
based services.  Moreover, only 17% of the television broadcasting 
spectrum is used nationwide.  As a result, the government seeks to 
reacquire 120 Mhz of the broadcasters’ 294 Mhz and redeploy it for 
mobile broadband applications. 
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Legal claims to property rights in the spectrum are highly 
tenuous, likely allowing the government to reclaim the broadcasters’ 
spectrum without compensation at the end of their license periods. 
Nevertheless, the government has announced several times that it 
plans to conduct the transition of television broadcast spectrum on a 
voluntary basis.  This decision is based on a variety of political and 
strategic considerations that compel the government to seek an 
equitable solution.  However, to the extent the process is indeed 
voluntary—that the broadcasters will not be forced to give up their 
licenses—the government is essentially recognizing even greater 
possession rights for the broadcasters than owners of private property 
traditionally enjoy.  Typically, owners of private property are subject 
to government seizure for public benefit in return for market-rate 
compensation for their loss.1  Voluntary return of spectrum, however, 
would put the broadcasters in a better position as the government is 
suggesting they will have the opportunity to reject the government’s 
proposed compensation. 
In any event, treating the spectrum rights as having elements of 
private property raises questions about how the government will 
compensate the broadcasters for their loss of spectrum rights.  In 
determining appropriate compensation, the government may adopt 
principles from rezoning and eminent domain actions.  If the 
government cannot reach a voluntary settlement with the 
broadcasters, it will likely have to turn to traditional takings strategies 
whereby the government takes control of private property on a non-
voluntary basis.  Insofar as rezoning and eminent domain are the 
government’s “next best option” to a voluntary deal, these principles 
will likely provide a significant backdrop to the negotiation process to 
obtain a voluntary agreement. 
Although zoning would potentially allow the government to 
acquire the broadcasters’ licenses at low rates, it is also problematic. 
If the government simply “rezones” the broadcasters’ permitted use 
of their spectrum license from television to mobile broadband, the 
broadcasters will undoubtedly argue that they are entitled to the new 
zoning rights.  If the broadcasters were to prevail on this argument, 
1. Despite the numerous announcements from various government sources that the
spectrum reallocation process would be voluntary for television broadcasters, the extent to 
which the process will actually be completely voluntary is still somewhat murky.  In order 
to obtain large swaths of contiguous nationwide spectrum, and deal with holdout 
broadcasters in certain markets, the government will likely need to force certain 
broadcasters to give up their spectrum in some markets.  This point is likely to be a highly 
contentious part of any plan to reacquire broadcasters’ spectrum. 
 
148 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:2
they would obtain the entire benefit from the conversion, leaving no 
benefit for the U.S. taxpayers.  On the other hand, if rezoning simply 
prevents the broadcasters from using their spectrum for broadcasting 
purposes, they would lose all return on their investment in their 
licenses.  The government could also reduce the broadcasters’ license 
rights via “downzoning” the spectrum to limit its use without 
compensation.  Any of these zoning approaches would likely result in 
an extreme result favoring one side, most likely the government, as 
opposed to an equitable incentive process balancing the competing 
interests of the broadcasters and society as a whole. 
However, eminent domain may be an efficient and principled 
method of reallocation that provides a viable framework for 
negotiating a buyout price for the television broadcasters.  Under the 
eminent domain approach, the government would purchase the 
broadcasters’ licenses at the fair market value of the loss it causes 
their current businesses.  The loss to broadcasters could be largely 
mitigated if the FCC is able to overcome potential First Amendment 
challenges and grants the foreclosed broadcasters permanent 
transmission rights for their content on cable and satellite platforms. 
For a relatively modest sum, the government could provide the 10% 
of viewers in affected areas currently relying on over-the-air 
broadcasting with a subsidized cable or satellite television 
subscription consisting of only the local broadcast channels to 
minimize loss of television access for current over-the-air viewers. 
A well-crafted eminent domain strategy would not only 
compensate television broadcasters for their economic losses, but 
would also allow them to remain in business and continue to serve 
their local communities with their content, thus also minimizing 
disruption to consumers.  The threat of rezoning, meanwhile, 
provides the government with a “stick” to encourage the broadcasters 
to agree to reasonable terms to vacate their spectrum.  After 
compensating the broadcasters for their partial business loss of the 
10% of viewers they reach with over-the-air transmission, the 
government would be able to re-auction the broadcasters’ spectrum 
for higher-value mobile broadband usage.  It would realize a net 
profit of approximately $28.5 to $38.3 billion after compensation to 
the broadcasters and subsidized cable or satellite subscriptions for 
affected viewers.  In addition, this reallocation would provide the 
bandwidth needed to unleash a huge expansion of mobile broadband 
in the United States and all of the accompanying social and economic 
benefits, which some economists estimate to be many multiples of the 
value of the spectrum itself. 
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Although well-settled eminent domain law prevents payments 
based on the increase in the value of the property for the 
government’s higher-value intended future use, political pressures 
may push the government to offer compensation to broadcasters 
somewhat beyond the current market value of television broadcast 
use.  In addition, the threat of rezoning the broadcasters’ rights may 
help constrain the upper boundary of any settlement to the 
broadcasters.  In this way, rezoning and eminent domain principles 
may both inform the negotiations and help provide an equitable 
outcome for the broadcasters and the U.S. taxpayers while preserving 
incentives for communications operators to invest in FCC licenses 
and build out of new services.  
II. Introduction
Demand for mobile broadband applications is soaring,2 and the 
FCC, which allocates spectrum for specific applications, believes that 
more spectrum should be allocated for this purpose.3, 4  This 
conclusion is widely supported by industry observers.  As part of the 
recently released National Broadband Plan, the FCC is seeking to 
reallocate 300 Mhz of spectrum over the next five years, and 500 Mhz 
by 2020, to mobile broadband applications.  Some industry observers 
advocate even larger amounts.5  Many economists point to a 
multiplier effect where the social and economic benefits of broadband 
deployment are many times the value of the project itself.6  The 
2. Cisco predicts a twenty six fold increase in mobile data traffic between 2010 and
2015.   Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2010–
2015, CISCO (Feb. 2011), http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ 
ns537/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-520862.html. 
3. David Gardner, FCC Chair Cites ‘Spectrum Crisis’, INFO. WEEK (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/mobile/220301552?cid=nl_IW_daily_
html [hereinafter Spectrum Crisis]. 
4. In a speech on September 27, 2011, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski said,
“The spectrum crunch is the single biggest threat to one of the most promising parts of our 
economy. There’s much we need to do to free up spectrum for mobile broadband . . .” 
Grant Gross, Citigroup Questions Whether U.S. Spectrum Shortage Exists, COMPUTER 




5. CTIA paper suggested 800 Mhz is needed.  See Comments of CTIA—The
Wireless Association NBP Public Notice #6, CTIA.ORG (Nov. 13, 2009), at 2, 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/filings/091023_CTIA_Comments_NBP_PN.pdf. 
6. Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Munoz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum
Allocation Policies, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-28, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908717 [hereinafter Hazlett & Munoz]. 
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National Broadband Plan warns that failure to address spectrum 
availability issues will lead to “higher prices, poor service quality, an 
inability for the United States to compete internationally, depressed 
demand and, ultimately, a drag on innovation.”7 
Numerous studies have documented the current inefficient 
allocation of electromagnetic spectrum in the United States. 
Nationwide, only about 17% of the available channel capacity in the 
current allocation of 294 Mhz of VHF8 and UHF9 spectrum to 
television broadcasters10, 11 is used for television broadcasting.12  
Moreover, over 90% of consumers subscribe to cable or satellite 
television services, leaving less than 10% of viewers exclusively 
watching over-the-air television broadcasts.  Thus, 294 Mhz of 
valuable spectrum is dedicated for limited use (17% of the available 
channel capacity, used by 10% of the population).13, 14  As part of the 
7. National Broadband Plan: Chapter 5 - Spectrum, BROADBAND.GOV, at 2–3,
www.broadband.gov/plan/5-spectrum [hereinafter Spectrum].  
8. VHF television broadcasting frequencies: 54–72 Mhz (channels 2–4); 77–88 Mhz
(channels 5–6); 174–216 Mhz (channels 7–13). 
9. UHF television broadcasting frequencies: 470–698 Mhz (channels 14–69; except
channel 37 between 608 and 614 Mhz, which is reserved for radio astronomy use).  Prior to 
June 2009, when television broadcasters converted to digital broadcasting and the 
channels were “repacked,” the UHF band extended from 608 to 800 Mhz.  The 
frequencies 698 to 800 were used for channels 52–69.  The 698–800 Mhz spectrum was 
auctioned in 2008–2009 in an auction dubbed “The 700 Mhz Auction” officially known as 
“Auction 73.”  Until the 1980s, channels 70 through 83 existed and utilized 806–884 Mhz.  
10. Phil Bellaria, Adam Gerson & Brian Weeks, Spectrum Analysis: Option for
Broadcast Spectrum, OBI Technical Paper No. 3, BROADBAND.GOV, at 7 (June 2010), 
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-omnibus-broadband-initiative-(obi)-technical-
paper-spectrum-analysis-options-for-broadband-spectrum.pdf [hereinafter OBI Technical 
Paper No. 3]. 
11. For comparison, the entire AM radio band occupies 1.2 Mhz of spectrum.  See
Robert M. Rast, The Dawn of Digital Television, INSIDE SPECTRUM TECH. (Oct. 2005), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer-electronics/audiovideo/the-dawn-of-digital-tv. 
12. Thomas W. Hazlett, Unleashing the DTV Band: A Proposal for an Overlay
Auction, NBP PUBLIC NOTICE 26, at 5–6 (Dec. 18, 2009), http://iep.gmu.edu/event/ 
unleashing-dtv-band-proposal-overlay-auction-comment-nbp-public-notice-26 [hereinafter 
Hazlett].  Hazlett’s calculation is 49 channel slots in 210 markets, or 10,290 available 
channels exist, but only 1,750 full power television stations are licensed.  
13. This unused “white space” is not contiguous and varies significantly by market.
14. The “Spectrum” report (Spectrum, supra note 6, at 7) includes a table valuing the
over-the-air subscribers as 14% to 19% of broadcasters’ total audience.  However, the 
widely accepted figure is close to 10% or less, which also matches Exhibit A on page 7 of 
the same report citing a Nelson’s estimate.  This seems to reflect the influence of the 
broadcasting industry.  While the broadcasting industry does not dispute that over 90% of 
U.S. homes subscribe to cable or satellite, one of their representatives, argued that in 
many cable and satellite homes, not all of the televisions are connected to cable and thus 
actually about 14% of homes use at least some over-the-air broadcasting.  Telephone 
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National Broadband Plan, the FCC seeks to reallocate 120 Mhz of the 
294 Mhz currently allocated to television broadcasting to mobile 
broadband applications.15 
One of the largest challenges in accomplishing spectrum 
reallocation is to determine how to divert spectrum from current 
applications and how (or if) to compensate current licensees of that 
spectrum.  Another challenge to clearing television broadcasters from 
the electromagnetic spectrum is the potential deprivation of television 
services to the small percentage16 of U.S. households that rely 
exclusively on over-the-air broadcasting. 
Notwithstanding the substantial challenges involved in any plan to 
reallocate the spectrum to allow it to be used for higher value 
applications, such reallocation is widely expected to provide 
economic and social benefits to society as a whole.  However, in order 
to effect this reallocation, the FCC must determine an appropriate 
mechanism for doing so.  The FCC must consider the rights of the 
current spectrum holders, television viewers, and U.S. taxpayers as 
well as political considerations and implications for longer term 
government policy.  Given the scarcity of spectrum and the ease of 
verifying who is using it, many policy makers have argued that, 
generally speaking, spectrum licenses should be awarded with full 
explicit property rights to incentivize their most valuable possible 
use.17, 18  However, FCC licenses do not grant property interests, and 
the government likely has the right to simply allow the licenses to 
Interview with John K. Hane, Counsel, Pillsbury, Winthrup, Shaw & Pittman (June 21, 
2010). 
15. Spectrum, supra note 7.
16. Approximately 11 million of the 114 million U.S. homes.  See Dennis Haarsager,
Over-the-air TV Households: the Real Number from TVB, TECH. 360 (June 14, 2010), 
http://technology360.typepad.com/technology360/2011/06/over-the-air-tv-householdsthe-
real-numbers-from-tvb-pubmedia.html. 
17. Thomas W. Merrill engages in an expanded discussion of the conditions that
often lead to the creation of property rights for regulated items.  See Thomas W. Merrill, 
Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 280 (2000).  
18. The idea that private property-based market allocation of spectrum would yield
the most efficient allocation for society have been most notably advocated by Ronald 
Coase in his seminal article.  See Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications 
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) [hereinafter Coase].  This idea is not fully accepted 
and has been rebutted by others.  See, e.g., David Moss & Michael Finn, Radio Regulation 
Revisited: Coase, the FCC, and the Public Interest, 389 J. POL’Y HIST. 15 (2003).  The latter 
paper argues that auctions do not capture the value of “public interests” such as the value 
of society having universal communication access or the value of improvements to 
democracy that occur as a result of greater communication, but only captures value that 
results from profit-making uses.  
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expire and then re-auction the spectrum for their higher value use in 
mobile broadband applications.19  
Despite the lack of a legal requirement to compensate the 
television broadcasters, the government is heavily motivated to do so. 
This is due to a combination of  political pressure from the 
broadcasters, the government’s desire to encourage FCC license 
holders to invest in offering advanced new services on their spectrum, 
and the desire to maximize revenue at spectrum auctions.  If the 
government were to set a precedent of not compensating the 
television broadcasters for their reasonable expectations of 
continuous renewal, this would likely cause uncertainty about the 
rights associated with FCC spectrum licenses.  Future bidders for 
FCC spectrum licenses would likely bid less for licenses and be more 
reluctant to invest aggressively in new services based on those 
licenses.  On the other hand, any compensation for broadcasters 
potentially increases the costs for the U.S. government dramatically. 
As a result, there is considerable tension over how (or even if) 
broadcasters should be compensated for their loss of spectrum rights 
when the spectrum is cleared for mobile broadband use.  Ultimately, 
the government has strong political and strategic incentives to 
develop an equitable solution with the broadcasters in any spectrum 
reallocation process as opposed to scoring a clear “win” over them. 
Accordingly, the government will likely seek to propose a mutually 
acceptable solution to clear the broadcasters off the spectrum. 
This article analyzes the nature of interests television broadcasters 
hold in their FCC spectrum licenses, and analyzes options for 
spectrum reallocation that minimize the potential inequities facing 
television broadcasters, viewers and U.S. taxpayers.  The article will 
also evaluate existing proposals from economic, public policy, and 
practical perspectives.  Finally, it will propose an alternate framework 
based on traditional property law principles that considers the 
challenges and costs to the government of reclaiming the spectrum. 
The proposed solution would fairly compensate the broadcasters and 
affected viewers, and would enable the government to realize 
substantial revenue from re-auctioning the spectrum for mobile 
broadband use.  
19. J. Armand Musey, Broadcasting Licenses: Ownership Rights and the Spectrum
Rationalization Challenge, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV., Vol. 13 (forthcoming 2012), 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1952138 [Hereinafter Ownership Rights]. 
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III. Nature of the Broadcast Spectrum Reallocation Challenge
The challenges in spectrum reallocation can largely be divided
into three categories.  The first challenge relates to protecting the 
viewing public from the possibility of significantly reduced television 
viewing options.  The second challenge is a question of how (or if) to 
minimize harm to broadcasters by their spectrum loss.  The third 
challenge is to protect the interests of the U.S. taxpayers in realizing 
the economic value of additional broadband spectrum.  These 
interests are somewhat intertwined.  It is instructive to examine each 
component of these interests individually. 
A. Broadcasters’ Spectrum Serves a Fraction of Their Viewers
A broadcasting license comprises two primary rights.  The first is
the right to broadcast television over a specified frequency, and the 
second is the right to require cable and satellite systems in the local 
area to rebroadcast their programming on their systems.  Although 
somewhat counterintuitive, most of the television broadcasters’ value 
lies not in over-the-air broadcasting, but rather from retransmission 
via satellite and cable.  Over-the-air broadcasting accounts, on 
average, for less than 10% of television viewers20 and has been slowly 
declining for several years.  Federal law requires cable companies to 
retransmit local broadcasters’ programming in their broadcast areas 
via the so-called “must-carry” rules.21  Similarly, the Satellite Home 
Viewer’s Act (“SHVA”) requires satellite television companies to 
retransmit all local broadcasts in the markets where they retransmit 
any of them.22  Thus, a reallocation process that would preserve must-
carry rights (on both satellite and cable) could allow most of the 
broadcasters whose spectrum is reclaimed to remain in business and 
serve their communities. 
1. Congressional Involvement is Necessary for Equitable Solution
One complication of preserving must-carry rules for broadcasters
who return their licenses is that Congress would have to both modify 
the current must-carry regime that is codified in the 1992 Cable Act,23 
20. See Spectrum, supra note 7, at n.87  (referencing a Neilson’s estimate of 9.7% for
the percentage of Americans who view over-the-air programming exclusively). 
21. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (2011) and 47 C.F.R. § 64 (2011) for “must carry” rules.
22. For a summary of the Satellite Home Viewers’ Act, see FED. COMMC’NS
COMM’N, The FCC’s Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act Page,  http://transition.fcc. 
gov/mb/shva/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
23. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-
385; 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
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and authorize a mechanism for the FCC to pay the broadcasters to 
return their spectrum.  This might be challenging, as members of 
Congress may not be eager to enter into the process of reclaiming 
television broadcasting licenses.  Many politicians strive to remain in 
good standing with their local broadcasters who have significant 
flexibility in granting them airtime under the guise of “news” without 
violating equal coverage rules.24  However, Congress may have little 
choice but to get involved if the FCC is not able reach an agreement 
with the broadcasters as consumer demand for additional mobile 
broadband spectrum is strong,25 experts are warning that delays in 
allocating it would hurt the economy,26, 27 and the U.S. Treasury is 
undoubtedly eager for the additional revenue that auctioning the 
spectrum for mobile broadband would raise.28  Absent congressional 
legislation, the FCC’s only viable option to reallocate the spectrum 
would be to use a “zoning approach” (described in Section IV. A. 
infra) to either upgrade the broadcasters to authorize mobile 
broadband use on their spectrum or to attempt to rezone it so that 
their rights expire at the end of their licenses.  The former would be 
an enormous give away of government assets, while the latter would 
impede other government objectives necessitating an equitable 
solution with the broadcasters. 
B. First Amendment Issues May Prevent Continued Must-CarryRegulation
Must-carry rules have allowed broadcasters to remain relevant
and profitable despite the dramatic decline in over-the-air television 
viewership.  There is a question as to whether those rules can be 
separated from the broadcasting licenses themselves and still 
withstand a First Amendment challenge.  Specifically, the courts may 
not accept a government strategy of lowering its costs of 
compensating the broadcasters by preserving must-carry rights for 
broadcasters whose spectrum it reclaims.  If the courts do not allow 
this strategy, the cost of reacquiring broadcasters’ licenses may 
24. Election Coverage and Equal Time, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N,
http://www.rtnda.org/pages/media_items/election-coverage-and-equal-time1600.php (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
25. Stacy Higginbotham, Spectrum Shortage will Strike in 2013, GIAOM (Feb. 17,
2010), http://gigaom.com/2010/02/17/analyst-spectrum-shortage-will-strike-in-2013/. 
26. Spectrum Crisis, supra note 3.
27. Hazlett, supra note 6.
28. Estimates of how much such an auction would raise vary significantly, usually
between $20 billion and $60 billion.  See Section V.B. infra for a further discussion of this 
topic. 
 
2012] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE BROADCASTING SPECTRUM 155
increase significantly and/or the viewing options for more viewers 
may decline. 
1. Turner I and II Support Must-Carry on Limited Grounds
The Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Turner Broadcasting
Systems v. FCC,29 held that must-carry rules did not violate the First 
Amendment because they were based not on the broadcasters’ 
content, but rather on their use of over-the-air broadcasting 
technology.  The Court noted: 
It is true that must-carry provisions distinguish between 
speakers in the television market. But they do so based only 
upon the manner in which speakers transmit their messages to 
viewers, and not upon the messages they carry . . . so long as 
they are not subtle means of exercising a content preference, 
speaker distinctions of this nature are not presumed invalid 
under the First Amendment.30 
In essence, Turner I prioritized speech that is transmitted through 
broadcast television over speech transmitted through other means.  It 
is not clear the broadcasters would enjoy this privileged position if 
they no longer broadcast. 
In a later must-carry case involving the same parties, Turner II,31 
the Court again upheld a must-carry regulation because it 
“further[ed] an important government interest; and . . . did not 
burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those 
interests.”32  The government interest in question was to “guarantee 
the survival of a medium that has become a vital part of the Nation’s 
communication system, and to ensure that every individual with a 
television set can obtain free television programming.”33  The Court 
therefore concluded that the must-carry provisions are consistent with 
the First Amendment.34  The Turner II decision confirmed that “must-
carry” provisions are allowable because they further an important 
governmental interest so long as they do not burden substantially 
29. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
30. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 645–46.
31. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).  This case was also a
5–4 decision (Breyer, J., Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, J., Souter, J., and Stevens, J. joined the 
opinion of the Court.  Ginsburg, J., O’Connor, J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J. dissented).  
32. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
33. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 647.
34. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
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more speech than is necessary to further that interest.35  To meet this 
standard, the broadcasters who surrendered their licenses would have 
to show their continued existence is an important governmental 
interest even after they ceased broadcasting. 
2. Breyer’s Turner II Concurring Opinion May Support Continued
Must-Carry for Former Broadcasters
In Turner II, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion emphasized the
public interest in must-carry regulation.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
was built, in part, on the Court’s earlier decision in Red Lion Broad. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).36  In Red Lion, the Court upheld an FCC
determination that it could require a broadcaster to provide air time
for a person to respond to a personal attack made on the
broadcaster’s news program.  The Court held that broadcasters
merely had First Amendment “interests”37 and “[i]t is the rights of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.”38  The Court also noted that “[t]here is nothing in the
First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a
licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices.”39  As a consequence, the Court ruled that the FCC could
regulate the broadcasters’ news coverage to ensure balanced
programming on scarce licensed spectrum.  Just as the Court in Red
Lion found that regulation was justified to ensure the public interest
in balanced news coverage, Justice Breyer’s Turner II concurrence
explained his belief that the must-carry statute’s main purpose was
“to assure the over-the-air public ‘access to a multiplicity of
information sources.’”40
Continuation of must-carry requirements after the broadcasters 
no longer broadcast over-the-air would be fully compatible with 
Turner I and Turner II so long as Congress finds another equally valid 
non-content based distinction to separate the broadcasters from 
others.  One such option would be the creation of “broadcasting 
licenses” given to former broadcasters if they meet designated 
content-neutral requirement(s).  However, there is a risk the Court 
35. Id.
36. Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
37. Id. at 386.
38. Id. at 390.
39. Id. at 389.
40. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at
663).  
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could find that such licenses are not valid because they privilege the 
now former broadcasters’ content because of who they are (former 
broadcasters) as opposed to “the manner in which the speakers 
transmit their messages to viewers.”41 
Even without a non-content based distinction, however, must-
carry regulation for former broadcasters may still be compatible with 
the Turner I and Turner II decisions if future courts adopt Justice 
Breyer’s view that such regulation is justified because it furthers the 
public interest in receiving information from multiple sources.  A 
court adopting this perspective would likely uphold continued must-
carry rules for former broadcasters so long as they do not burden 
speech more than necessary to achieve an important government 
objective.  The important government interest would be the 
promotion of widespread access to local television content for cable 
and satellite subscribers as well as over-the-air viewers.42  Local 
television broadcasters are a primary source of local news content for 
many people, regardless of how they receive their television signals. 
The benefits of diversity of content, particularly local content, could 
not be fully maintained without keeping the current broadcasters in 
business via transmission on cable and satellite systems.  Accordingly, 
must-carry requirements for former broadcasters could likely meet 
the more stringent “intermediate scrutiny” standard of review 
whereby the reviewing court must consider whether the statute 
involves important governmental interests and whether the law is 
substantially related to the achievement of important governmental 
objectives.43 
3. But Would Courts Uphold Must-Carry Today Under Any Circumstance?
The bigger question for the broadcasters is whether must-carry
regulation would be upheld today under any circumstance.44  Turner I 
suggests must-carry regulation was designed specifically to protect 
41. Turner I, 520 U.S. at 645.
42. In enacting spectrum reallocation legislation that includes must-carry rules for
non-broadcasting broadcasters, Congress could make a specific finding about the 
importance of the government objective of promoting access to local broadcasting content. 
43. Intermediate Scrutiny, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Sept. 4, 2010) (defining 
intermediate scrutiny). 
44. See Petition for Writ of Certiori, Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 2010 WL 326554
(No. 09-901), cert. denied.  Cablevision petitioned for writ of certiorari in this case seeking 
to overturn must-carry regulation.  Cablevision’s argument is largely that, based on 
changes in the media industry, the original rationale for must-carry no longer applies.  
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only those people who do not subscribe to cable television by 
ensuring they had content: 
Appellants contend, in this regard [that even non-content-
based must-carry rules have content implications], that the 
must-carry regulations are content-based because Congress’ 
purpose in enacting them was to promote speech of a favored 
content. We do not agree. Our review of the [Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition] Act and its various 
findings persuades us that Congress’ overriding objective in 
enacting must-carry was not to favor programming of a 
particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to 
preserve access to free television programming for the 40 
percent of Americans without cable.45 
Any benefits of must-carry to cable and satellite subscribers are 
not mentioned.  Moreover, the value of protecting those who rely on 
over-the-air broadcasting has greatly diminished.  When Turner I was 
decided in 1994, approximately 40% of U.S. households did not have 
cable, and the percentage was not significantly lower in 1997 when 
Turner II was decided.46  Today, the situation is quite different insofar 
as approximately 90% of U.S. households presently subscribe to cable 
or satellite systems and less than 10% rely exclusively on over-the-air 
transmission.47  As a result, one of the primary justifications for 
upholding must-carry regulation has substantially diminished. 
Moreover, the opinion of the Court in Red Lion and Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion in Turner II represent the “public trust” 
model of regulation whereby spectrum is held for the benefit of the 
public.  Krystilyn Corbett48 argues that the “public trust” model has 
waned over time in favor of the “private market” model that gives 
greater control of spectrum resources to license holders. 
Additionally, given the diminishing number of over-the-air television 
viewers and changes in the composition of the Supreme Court,49 must-
45. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 646.
46. Satellite as a comparable substitute to cable television was a very small part of the
broadcasting industry in 1994 as the high powered satellite television providers (the DBS 
systems—DirectTV and EchoStar) did not begin service until after 1994.  
47. Many industry observers suggest that, when piracy is included, approximately
95% of U.S. households have cable or satellite television service. 
48. Krystilyn Corbett, The Rise of Property Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum, 46
DUKE L.J. 611 (1996) [hereinafter Corbett]. 
49. The Turner I case was decided in a 5–4 decision and the majority included
Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Souter.  Only Justice Kennedy
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carry regulation would probably not be upheld today unless the Court 
were to find that its benefits extend to cable and satellite viewers by 
providing them access to local content they would not otherwise have. 
However, the Court may well reject this argument as part of a move 
to a private market approach to spectrum regulation that would give 
higher priority to the First Amendment rights of broadcasters than 
previous Courts have done.50  Given the possible shift away from the 
public trust model of spectrum regulation and the diminishing 
number of over-the-air television viewers, it is not clear that Justice 
Breyer’s concurring view in Turner II would be adopted by the Court 
in a review of must-carry rules today. 
If spectrum reallocation legislation resulted in must-carry rules 
that include broadcasters who no longer broadcast over-the-air, the 
satellite and cable companies would have an opportunity to re-litigate 
the must-carry rules.  Such litigation might allow the Court to 
reconsider its decision without explicitly having to overturn Turner I 
or Turner II.  Finally, as explained below, the must-carry rules are 
becoming less relevant as fewer broadcasters avail themselves of this 
option.  Because of the decreasing relevance of the must-carry rules, a 
successful court challenge to these rights may not be a fatal blow for 
the broadcasting industry.  Rather, the industry may just have to 
shrink somewhat, letting the majority who can survive without must-
carry do so.  In the worst case, the cost of compensating the 
broadcasters could rise to $15.2 billion.51  If the must-carry rules can 
be preserved for broadcasters whose spectrum is reclaimed and can 
remains on the Court today.  The dissent included Justices Ginsburg, O’Connor, Scalia 
and Thomas, all of whom except Justice O’Connor remain on the Court today.  Turner II 
was also a 5–4 decision with Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and Stevens affirming and 
Justices Ginsberg, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting.  As a whole, the justices of 
today’s Court have a stronger private market perspective than those of the Turner era.  
Court observers widely view today’s Court as less likely to uphold market regulation that 
impinges on Constitutional rights (including First Amendment rights) of FCC licensees 
than earlier Courts.  Changes in the media marketplace could give the Court an 
opportunity to revisit Turner I and Turner II and effectively nullify the decision without 
explicitly overturning it.  
50. The dissent in Turner II made it clear it viewed prioritization of certain types of
programming, such as local programming, as not being content neutral.  Turner II, 520 
U.S. at 235. 
51. Economist Colemen Bazelon et al.’s detailed economic analysis conservatively
suggests  the cost to buyout the affected broadcaster’s spectrum in a reverse auction 
process would be approximately $14.4 billion plus $0.78 billion to repack the spectrum for 
a total of $15.4 billion.  Coleman Bazelon, Charles L. Jackson & Giulia McHenry, An 
Engineering and Economic Analysis of the Prospects of Reallocating Radio Spectrum from 
the Broadcast Band through the Use of Voluntary Incentive Auctions, TELECOMM. POLICY 
RESEARCH CTR., 2, (Sept. 19, 2011) http://www.tprcweb.com/jdownloads/2011/Spectrum 
%20Markets/tprc-2011-sm-3.pdf [hereinafter Bazelon II]. 
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also satisfy First Amendment concerns, they have the potential to 
dramatically reduce the impact of broadcasters’ losing their spectrum 
on both the broadcasters and their viewers. 
One complication to a strategy of maintaining must carry rules for 
television broadcasters who surrender their spectrum licenses is that 
absent spectrum licenses, the broadcasters using cable and satellite 
for distribution would naturally feel less secure about their 
businesses.  This is because future amendments in the law could deny 
them retransmission rights on cable and satellite systems.  These 
concerns could be alleviated by a clear contract providing for 
liquidated damages if the broadcasters’ retransmission rights on cable 
and satellite were ever disrupted due to future changes in the law or 
adverse court decisions. 
C. Television Service Gaps Will Arise
If television broadcasters are cleared from the electromagnetic
spectrum, a small percentage of households which rely exclusively on 
over-the-air broadcasting may never pay to subscribe to cable or 
satellite television services. Accordingly, the question arises as to 
whether spectrum reallocation will deprive these individuals of access 
to television. 
1. Subsidized Cable or Satellite May Bridge the Access Gap
If Congress wanted to preserve off-the-air television viewers’
access to television as well as the television broadcasters’ over-the-air 
audience, it could require purchasers of mobile broadband spectrum 
to allow free access to a server containing on-demand content from 
each of the broadcasters.  This solution, however, is not likely to 
work, as it would require too much bandwidth to individually stream 
local broadcasts wirelessly.  Of course, as wireless broadband 
compression technology improves, this may someday become 
possible, particularly in rural areas where more bandwidth is 
available. 
A more plausible solution, however, would be for the government 
to subsidize a basic “local stations only” package for those viewers. 
Almost every U.S. home has access to either cable or satellite service. 
EchoStar and DirecTV offer local subscription packages for only 
$5.99 a month.52  The cable systems have similar content costs as the 
52. Based on the author’s personal knowledge, these are highly profitable services for
EchoStar and DirecTV at $5.99 per month with content costs averaging less than 25% of 
revenue, but they are always sold in conjunction with a larger package.  A “local channels 
only” service is likely to be challenging from a billing and administrative perspective, but 
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satellite providers. Based on a cost of $6.00 per month, and allowing 
for the installation cost assumptions of $87.50 to reflect a 75/25 
percent mix of cable and satellite (with higher installation costs for 
satellite), a discount rate of 8 percent and 5% annual subscriber churn 
would produce an estimate of approximately $9.7 billion to move all 
over-the-air viewers to basic cable or satellite systems.  However, as 
described in Section V.A. below, only broadcasters in approximately 
20% of the markets will be impacted.  While those markets are more 
densely populated, they are likely to have a lower percentage of over-
the-air viewership.53  Assuming, on balance, these markets also have 
12% of the over-the-air viewers, the cost of moving them to cable or 
satellite is reduced to $2.3 billion.  (See Exhibit 1 below for sensitivity 
analysis of the cost of subsidizing cable/satellite service for 
subscribers currently receiving exclusively over-the-air reception.) 
Under any realistic assumptions, the revenue potential from the 
spectrum auction54 and the social benefits of increased broadband 
spectrum dwarfs this cost.  Moreover, since less than 100% of the 
affected viewers are likely to sign up for the subsidized cable or 
satellite subscription, the cost is likely to be somewhat lower. 
the government could probably simply send the check to the cable company in bulk each 
month to reduce costs and still keep the service viable at these prices.  
53. Dianne E. Watson, Keynote Address to Minority Media and
Telecommunications Council Regulatory Breakfast on Minority Media Ownership and 
Telecommunications Legislation (July 2005),  available at http://www.womenspeech 
archive.org/files/c_1164814080880.pdf [hereinafter Watson]. 
54. See supra, note 28, and infra Section V.B. for a discussion of revenue potential
from auctioning television broadcasting spectrum for mobile broadband use. 
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2. Channel Sharing May Alleviate Reduction in Broadcasting Options
Even if approximately 40% of the broadcast spectrum in those
markets is redeployed, residents will still have over-the-air 
broadcasting from the remaining 60% of the broadcasters without 
changes.  They will hardly be deprived of choice relative to most of 
the rest of the country, particularly if they are offered a subsidized 
cable subscription plan.  However, another option to preserve 
broadcasters‘ businesses would be to utilize the industry’s remaining 
spectrum differently and potentially more efficiently.  With the digital 
conversion, television broadcasters no longer require the full 6 Mhz 
of spectrum they currently receive with their licenses to broadcast a 
standard television show.  Standard definition channels now only 
require approximately 1 Mhz and even high definition channels can 
be broadcast with approximately 3 Mhz of spectrum.  This opens the 
possibility of channel “sharing” whereby two stations, or more, could 
“share” one 6 Mhz channel or repacking each channel to only 3–4 
Mhz so as to accommodate more of existing broadcasters on less 
spectrum.  Such spectrum realignments, while within the FCC’s 
current authorization, often require a painful regulatory process the 
FCC may not be willing to endure.55 
Regardless of whether the government chooses continued must-
carry with subsidized cable and satellite, channel sharing or smaller 
television broadcast spectrum allocations to accommodate more 
broadcasters, it has several options to ensure that residents in regions 
served by broadcasters who lose spectrum have access to free local 
broadcast content. These options would leave considerable savings 
after the receipt of $34.9 billion to $41.7 billion of auction proceeds, 
minus the compensation, if any, to broadcasters and/or subsidization 
of basic cable and satellite.56 
55. The FCC recommends that Congress expand its powers to offer various incentive
auctions to incumbent licensees largely because “[c]ontentious spectrum proceedings can 
be time-consuming, sometimes taking many years to resolve, and incurring significant 
opportunity costs.  One way to address this challenge is by motivating existing licensees to 
voluntarily clear spectrum through incentive auctions.” Spectrum, supra note 7, at 
Recommendation 5.4. 
56. See supra note 28, and Exhibits 5 and 6 in Section V.B. infra for an analysis of
potential auction proceeds. 
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D. Government Promises to Respect Broadcasters’ Property Interests in
Their FCC Licenses
On multiple occasions in 2010 and 2011,57, 58 the government
announced it would transition the television broadcast spectrum on a 
voluntary basis. That is, the government would negotiate the terms of 
the buyout with the broadcasters, who could opt out of the 
settlement.  Because the process is “voluntary,” the broadcasters 
could theoretically refuse to participate and instead retain control of 
their licenses, thus thwarting the government’s desire to reacquire the 
spectrum.  Moreover, by proposing such negotiations, the 
government is essentially offering to implicitly recognize that the 
broadcasters possess property rights in their licenses (or at least that 
the government will behave in a manner that mimics such 
recognition).  This is because the ability to control an asset is a critical 
element of property rights.  As a result of the government’s de facto 
recognition that broadcasters possess property rights in their licenses, 
the broadcasters would be entitled to compensation for any 
deprivation of those interests.  Industry observers have speculated as 
to the pricing and terms of the television broadcasters’ buyout.  Few 
doubt the broadcasters will end up with a package that does less than 
make them whole. 
IV. Existing Proposals for Removing Television Broadcasters
From the Electromagnetic Spectrum 
With the question of recognizing property rights effectively 
resolved for purposes of efficiently moving the broadcasters off the 
spectrum, the debate shifts to how to determine appropriate 
compensation to the broadcasters for voluntarily relinquishing their 
spectrum rights.  Given the estimated enterprise value59 of the 
57. Lawrence Summers, director of the National Economic Council, is quoted as
saying “Our plan [to free-up spectrum for mobile broadband] will allow all stations that 
currently broadcast the right to continue to broadcast,” in a speech at the New America 
Foundation on June 29, 2010.  “It is based on the principle of voluntarism.”  Summers 
Emphasizes Voluntary Return of Broadcast Spectrum, TELEVISION BROADCAST .COM,  
(June 28, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.televisionbroadcast.com/article/102670.  
58. Julius Genachowski, chairman of the FCC, is quoted as saying, “but the single
biggest step [to free-up spectrum for mobile broadband] is voluntary incentive auctions.” 
Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Jobs and the Broadband Economy, Address at 
LivingSocial Event (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/genachow 
skis-speech-jobs-and-broadband-economy. 
59. “Enterprise Value” is a financial term used to denote the full value of a business.
It is calculated as equity value + debt – cash + other adjustments. 
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broadcasting industry is approximately $60 billion to $65 billion,60 and 
the implications any precedent may have on other FCC licensees, the 
issue of spectrum reallocation has received considerable attention 
from the broadcasting industry, consumer groups and from those 
concerned about maximizing the benefits to the U.S. Treasury from a 
future re-auction of the spectrum.  Unsurprisingly, many proposed 
solutions have been advanced—each with their own strengths and 
weaknesses. 
A. Not Renewing Licenses is an Option
One possible solution for reallocating the television broadcast
spectrum is for the FCC to simply not renew the licenses of the 
television broadcasters at the end of their license periods.  While this 
would be consistent with the letter of the law and the legislative 
history, it might be an uphill battle from a historical interpretation 
perspective.  It would essentially deny the broadcasters any property 
rights based on either licenses or easement or adverse possession. 
However, based on the government’s experience with cattle grazing 
permits, this option may be feasible for the government.  Specifically, 
holders of grazing permits had considerably greater historical 
precedent and some arguably favorable legislative history supporting 
their arguments for renewal rights than do broadcasters.61  
Nevertheless, courts have consistently allowed the government to 
deny renewal of the permits based on a textual analysis of the 
applicable statutes.62  Similarly, courts would likely permit 
government nonrenewal of broadcasters’ licenses based on the same 
textual analysis of the communications statutes.63 
Perhaps the strongest argument for this approach is that it would 
help to prevent setting a precedent that holders of government 
licenses, in any area, from mining, to oil drilling to cattle grazing, 
possess property rights associated with those licenses.  The U.S. 
60. One report estimates the enterprise value of the broadcasting industry to be $63.2
billion.  See Coleman Bazelon, The Need for Additional Spectrum for Wireless Broadband: 
The Economic Benefit and Costs of Reallocations, WHITE PAPER, at 13 (Oct. 23, 2009) 
[hereinafter Bazelon I]. An FCC report estimates it to be $63.7 billion.  Spectrum, supra 
note 7 at n.87. [collectively, hereinafter Broadcast Industry Valuation]. 
61. Ownership Rights, supra note 19, at 27.
62. See, e.g., Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000); Fed. Lands Legal
Consortium v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999). 
63. The FCC has stated it has this right. The FCC also claims it has the right to
modify licenses in the middle of license periods. FCC Report 10-201, at 76, FCC (Dec. 23, 
2010), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1223/FCC-10-201 
A1.pdf, [hereinafter FCC Report 10-201].  
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government cannot function efficiently if it faces the risk of 
unwillingly granting property rights anytime it grants a license to 
access government resources.  From a political perspective, however, 
non-renewal of licenses would be considered “unfair” and give the 
broadcasters significant ability to mobilize their already powerful 
political support.  Even if successful, this approach would likely also 
take considerable time due to the numerous legal challenges and 
appeals from the broadcasters.64  Moreover, it may well put many 
broadcasters out of business, depriving their viewers of the benefits of 
their television content.  Another problem with the nonrenewal 
approach is that it would likely cause current and potential FCC 
spectrum license holders to question the certainty of their license 
rights.  This would disincentivize them to bid the highest rates at FCC 
auctions and invest in the aggressive build out of the very advanced 
broadband services the FCC seeks to encourage. 
B. Upgrade the Television Broadcasting Licenses Free of Cost
The opposite extreme to not renewing broadcasting licenses is to
“upgrade” the broadcasters’ rights.  Currently, the broadcasters’ 
licenses only allow them to use their spectrum for television 
broadcasting and some limited ancillary uses. An upgrade would 
allow the broadcasters to migrate their use of frequency from 
television broadcasting to mobile data.  This is somewhat similar to 
Evan Kwerel and John Williams’ proposal,65 which advocates having 
the broadcasters auction their spectrum to parties, including 
themselves, who would use it for the highest value alongside a 
government auction for unassigned broadcasting spectrum.  This 
approach would be the most politically expedient solution with 
respect to the broadcasting community and the FCC could effect it 
without the need for congressional action.  This proposal would likely 
eliminate any resistance from the broadcasters because they would 
receive a free option to use their licenses for more lucrative mobile 
broadband.  The government could potentially implement the free 
“upgrade” approach quickly and unleash the significant societal 
benefits from the increased broadband access.  This approach would 
64. Ownership Rights, supra note 19, at 45.
65. Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market
Allocation of Spectrum, in 38 OPP WORKING PAPER SERIES (November 2002) [hereinafter 
Kwerel & Williams]. 
 
166 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:2
also place spectrum in private hands, an approach many economists 
favor.66 
However, giving the mobile broadband usage rights to the 
broadcasters would also likely generate massive resistance from other 
holders of mobile broadband spectrum, notably the wireless carriers 
who, since the 1990s,67 have paid enormous amounts for their 
spectrum.  These carriers would object that the dramatic increase in 
supply of spectrum would decrease the value of their spectrum.  In 
addition, those who paid handsomely for their spectrum rights for 
mobile broadband use would legitimately complain that the free grant 
of mobile broadband rights to broadcasters would give the 
broadcasters an unfair competitive advantage.  Unlike the incumbent 
mobile broadband providers, the broadcasters would have no debt 
service or return-on-investment hurdles related to acquiring the 
spectrum.68  
These concerns could be alleviated, however, through an auction 
process whereby broadband rights would be auctioned and the 
existing holders, the broadcasters in this case, would keep the 
proceeds.  Existing mobile broadband providers, for whom the value 
of spectrum is highest, would likely purchase the majority of the 
spectrum.69  Furthermore, because all acquirers in an auction would 
have to pay for their spectrum, there would be little change in 
competitive position with respect to debt levels, return on investment 
hurdles or other financial/strategic issues. 
The most problematic aspect of Kwerel and Williams’ “give-
away” approach is that it would deprive the federal government of 
any revenue from the new use of the broadcasters’ spectrum.  The 
value would go to the broadcasters who did not even pay the 
government for the rights to use the spectrum for television 
66. This line of economic thinking started most prominently with Ronald Coase’s
seminal article.  See Coase, supra note 18. 
67. In the 1980s, the early stages of the wireless industry, wireless operators received
FCC spectrum licenses without payment based on a comparative hearing process. 
68. When the FCC authorized the Alternative Terrestrial Component (“ATC”)
which enabled the satellite telephone carriers to use their spectrum terrestrial, there was 
enormous negative feedback from the wireless carriers.  Lynetta Luna, Satellites and 
Spectrum, URGENT COMMC’NS (March 1, 2003), http://urgentcomm.com/mag/radio_ 
satellites_spectrum.  Allowing television broadcasters free “upgrade” of their spectrum to 
use it for mobile broadband would be exponentially larger, and presumably cause an even 
greater outcry.  
69. Given the enormous start-up costs and economies of scale for a mobile
communications service, it would be unlikely for a new service to emerge if it has to pay 
market price for all of its assets. Therefore, the successful bidders for spectrum are likely 
to be existing telecom service providers. 
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broadcasting, much less for the more economically valuable use of 
mobile broadband services.  To simply give this excess value to the 
broadcasting industry would be an enormous act of government waste 
and deprive U.S. taxpayers of a significant source of revenue. 
However, if the FCC is not able to strike a deal with the broadcasters, 
they may be forced into this solution.  After a certain amount of 
delay, the large economic benefits to society of broadband 
deployment could outweigh the waste involved in giving away large 
amounts of spectrum value.  As mentioned previously, if Congress 
does not act, the FCC may have little choice. 
C. “Incentive Auctions” and Other Upside Sharing Between Broadcasters
and the Government
Several legislative proposals suggest the government should
“share” the upside of the higher value use of the spectrum with the 
broadcasters via “incentive auctions”70 or other suggest methods such 
as “overlay rights.”71  The primary problem with these “sharing” 
solutions is that they are not based on clear, defensible legal 
principles.  Almost any level of sharing of the “upside” for the move 
from television broadcasting to mobile broadband is destined to seem 
arbitrary and turn into an entirely political negotiation.  This could 
also set a problematic precedent, as it might suggest to licensees of 
other spectrum the FCC might want to repurpose that the FCC is 
required to share the increased value from that repurposing with 
them as well.  Additionally, the introduction of a new paradigm for 
spectrum allocation is likely to take a long time to clear political 
hurdles and be accepted by the many constituencies involved.  As 
previously noted, time is critical in moving television broadcast 
spectrum to make additional room for mobile broadband use. 
Finally, voluntary sharing models will not ensure the availability of 
uniform amount of spectrum nationwide needed for efficient mobile 
broadband deployment.  Some involuntary methods will likely still be 
needed to clear holdout broadcasters in certain markets. 
70. These include provisions in House Resolution 2482 and expected provisions in
the recommendation of the United States Congress Joint Select Committee on Deficit 
Reduction—also known as the “super committee.”  See American Jobs Act of 2011, H.R. 
2482, 111th Cong., Doc. No. 112-53 (2011); Sam Churchill, NTIA “Finds” 1.5 GHz of 
Federal Spectrum, DAILYWIRELESS.ORG (Oct. 19, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://www.daily 
wireless.org/2011/10/19/ntia-finds-1-5-ghz-of-federal-spectrum/. 
71. Professor Hazlett proposes an auction of rights for mobile broadband rights using
the current television broadcast spectrum whereby the auction winner would need to 
negotiate approval for use with the television broadcaster occupying that spectrum. 
Hazlett, supra note 6, at 9–18. 
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In a twist on the sharing model, a recent proposal by the 
broadcasting industry72 suggests the government upgrade their 
spectrum licenses to allow the broadcasters to work with broadband 
providers to “overlay” their broadband services on traditional 
television broadcasting, presumably on the portions of their 6 Mhz 
allocations they are not using.  The broadband providers would pay a 
fee to the television broadcasters. In return, the television 
broadcasters would share a portion of this fee with the federal 
government.  Conceptually, this concept is even more egregious than 
the incentive auction proposal from a public policy perspective.  With 
the incentive auction proposal, the broadcasters, who have minimal 
legal rights to the spectrum are being offered an opportunity to give 
up their spectrum in return for a share of the upside when it is sold. 
In the case of the “overlay” proposal, the broadcasters are asking for 
greater rights to their spectrum with an offer to “share” some of it 
with the federal government.  Presumably, they are advocating 
retaining control of the spectrum to achieve greater economics than 
simply sharing in the auction proceeds, thus increasing the level of 
waste for U.S. taxpayers. 
A significant redeeming feature of sharing proposals, however, is 
that they offer the broadcasters significant upside while avoiding a 
direct government payout, which would more directly expose the 
government to charges of waste.  Of course, under any sharing plan, 
the U.S. government would ultimately indirectly pay for the expected 
cost of any payments to the broadcasters as the revenue from the sale 
of the broadcasting rights would be less than a direct sale of the 
spectrum by the expected amount of the cost to “clear” the 
broadcasters from the spectrum.  Accordingly, despite its potential 
political merits, sharing proposals are neither optimal for the U.S. 
Treasury nor will they quickly and uniformly clear spectrum for next 
generation mobile broadband providers. 
D. Licensing “White Spaces” Between the Television Broadcasters
Since only about 17% of the broadcast channel allocation is used,
another possible way to accommodate mobile broadband applications 
without disturbing current television broadcasters is for the FCC to 
license the unused “white space” between the frequencies used by 
broadcasters.  This idea has at least four major problems. The first 
72. Rick Smith, Broadcast Coalition Offers Alternative to FCC Spectrum Auction,
WRALTECHWIRE (Oct. 20, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://wraltechwire.com/business/tech_wire/ 
opinion/blogpost/10281218/. 
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problem is the white space tends to differ in each television 
Designated Market Area (“DMA”).  As a result, consumer devices 
would likely need complex technology to detect which frequencies 
could be used in certain areas without interfering with the television 
broadcasters.  This in turn would drive up the cost and complexity of 
rolling out incremental mobile broadband services.  As a second 
problem, white space tends to be most abundant in rural areas where 
demand for incremental spectrum is lowest, while white space is less 
available in metropolitan areas where demand is the highest.  For 
example, in the Los Angeles/San Diego area, there is, even with no 
adjacent channel protection, only 60 MHz of white space, whereas in 
Wichita there is 216 Mhz.73  While 60 MHz is a significant amount of 
spectrum, it is one fifth of the 300 Mhz the FCC is seeking in the first 
stage of the National Broadband Plan.  Moreover, when FCC Radius 
channel protection is added, there is only 6 Mhz of white space in the 
Los Angeles/San Diego area and none in New York, but 102 Mhz in 
Wichita.74  The third problem is that licensing white space would lock 
new users into fragmented spaces of spectrum that are frequently not 
individually large enough to be optimal for mobile broadband. 
Moreover, the broadcasters’ business model has been under 
pressure75 and many will likely go out of business over the next 
several years.76 Therefore, it does not make sense for the FCC to 
encourage new mobile broadband services to build their business 
models around suboptimal pieces of spectrum that will be eventually 
clearing, albeit slowly, on their own.  It makes more sense for the 
government to have an organized national spectrum clearing 
process.77  Finally, the fragmented nature of the spectrum and its 
73. COLEMAN BAZELON, CHARLES L. JACKSON & DOROTHY ROBYN, COMMENTS 
OF CHARLES L. JACKSON, DOROTHY ROBYN AND COLEMAN BAZELON (THE VALUE OF 
WHITE SPACE) Figure B-2 (2008), available at http://www.brattle.com/_documents/ 
uploadlibrary/upload691.pdf. [Hereinafter Service Rules]. 
74. Id. at Figure B-4.
75. See discussion infra Part V. A. for a further discussion of television broadcasters’
business model. 
76. The television broadcasters will likely experience some increase in advertising
revenue over the next year due to increased political advertising in the 2012 election cycle 
and the emergence of the U.S. economy from recession.  However, the long-term industry 
outlook is negative. 
77. Some of the third objection could be solved by “repacking” the remaining
broadcaster’s spectrum.  Repacking would involve an FCC administrative process 
whereby remaining broadcasters’ frequency is reorganized into contiguous blocks, 
potentially allowing for large continuous nationwide blocks for mobile broadband.  The 
transition to digital broadcasting facilitates this process since broadcasters could 
potentially keep their station number on viewers’ digital receivers even though the 
broadcast frequency has changed.  Broadcasters would, however, need to make changes to 
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inverse availability in areas relative to where it is needed most would 
lower its value in any auctions.  One study put a maximum value of 
such an auction at $24.4 billion, with a projection for half that amount 
if there is adjacent channel protection to reduce interference between 
licensees.78  This is significantly lower than levels indicated in the 
analysis in Exhibit 5. While the FCC has decided to allocate some 
white-space spectrum to unlicensed mobile broadband usage,79 this 
can only be a small part of the solution.  Meeting the FCC’s goal of 
reallocating 120 Mhz of spectrum nationwide will require that some 
broadcasting licenses, particularly in metropolitan areas, be revoked, 
or not renewed, with or without compensation. 
Some telecommunication industry observers have suggested 
unlicensed applications for white space.80  This is preferable to the 
long-term commitments that would implicitly be made by licensing 
this spectrum, but it does not give businesses the confidence they 
would need to invest heavily in development of new mobile 
broadband services.  It also does not solve the interference concerns 
and would not provide any money to the U.S. Treasury.81 
E. Grandfathering Current Broadcasters to Slowly “Phase-in” Spectrum
Changeover
Another option is to “grandfather” existing broadcasters while
preventing new entrants in the broadcast spectrum. In many 
environmental regulatory situations, regulators often “grandfather” 
existing participants, rather than buying them out.  This allows them 
to continue indefinitely, while not allowing new entrants, in order to 
change an accepted practice over a period of time.  In the 
broadcasters’ situation, this would mean letting existing broadcasters 
continue, but not issuing new broadcast licenses.  This has the obvious 
advantage of avoiding a costly government buyout as the new regime 
is implemented and the “grandfathered” participants cease. 
However, this would be a very slow process as many broadcasters 
their transmission equipment.  One estimate of this cost is $0.78 billion.  Bazelon II, supra 
note 51, at 22. 
78. Comments of Jackson, et al., supra note 73, at 7.
79. Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, ET Docket No. 04-186 (Sep. 23, 2010),
available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db0923/FCC-10-
174A1.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
80. Sascha D. Meinrath & Michael Calabrese, Unlicensed “White Space Device”
Operations on the TV Band and the Myth of Harmful Interference, NEW AMERICA 
FOUND., (Mar. 2008). 
81. Anecdotal information from industry sources indicates the U.S. Treasury is
closely watching this process with an eye towards maximizing revenue for the government. 
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have been in business for decades and are not likely to voluntarily 
leave the industry soon.  “Grandfathering” tends to work better in 
other contexts, such as pollution, where the plants (or machinery) 
causing the pollution naturally need to be replaced over time due to 
wear and tear.  Moreover, for broadcasters to find grandfathering 
palatable, they would want to be able to transfer their grandfathered 
permits.  If this were allowed, any meaningful reduction of television 
broadcast frequency usage would take decades.  Grandfathering is an 
option that is more appropriate when trying to prevent an unwanted 
externality, such as pollution, from increasing, as opposed to rapidly 
decreasing it as is the need with television broadcasting over the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 
V. Traditional Property Rights Principles Provide a
Mechanism for Compensating Broadcasters 
Given the government’s effective recognition of elements of 
property rights in broadcasters’ spectrum licenses, the established 
traditional property principles of zoning and eminent domain—two 
methods by which government can reclaim its rights to private 
property—may provide the most simple, the most politically 
expedient and the most principled framework for guiding a solution 
to compensate broadcasters.  The balance of this paper will explore 
these two options. 
A. Zoning Alone is of Limited Use in Framing a Solution
Zoning concepts may be useful in the context of spectrum
reallocation, but are ultimately problematic as a complete solution. 
Through zoning ordinances, governments frequently alter property 
rights to achieve a desired social outcome.  Zoning ordinances often 
significantly alter the value of property or even prohibit the owner 
from engaging in their current business.  Currently, the broadcast 
television spectrum is “zoned” exclusively for that use.  As a city 
planner might rezone a section of town from commercial to 
residential, the FCC could theoretically “rezone” the spectrum from 
use for television broadcast use to mobile broadband use.  While this 
“rezoning” would ultimately increase the value of the spectrum to 
society (by allowing for mobile broadband use), it would likely 
eliminate the value of the current holders of broadcasting licenses, 
defeating the government’s desire for an equitable solution.  In 
addition, “rezoning” entails uncertainties that limit its desirability as a 
solution to the challenge of spectrum reallocation. 
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1. Uncertainty with Zoning Approach
An attempt by the FCC to rationalize spectrum use by changing
the “zoning” of the television broadband spectrum to exclusive 
mobile broadband use would be risky because the impact on existing 
broadcasters is uncertain.  If commercial land, for example, is rezoned 
residential, the owner can still build a residential home on the 
property.  In the spectrum context, however, it is not certain whether 
a rezoning would similarly give the existing television broadcasters 
the right to use the spectrum for the “rezoned” (and much more 
valuable) mobile broadband use. 
Alternatively, such rezoning may eliminate their rights to the 
spectrum completely.  The first scenario (whereby the broadcasters 
would automatically have rights to the rezoned spectrum) is unlikely 
because it requires a determination that broadcasters have complete 
property rights for all authorized uses of their spectrum, insofar as 
they could use the spectrum for the new more valuable mobile 
broadband applications.  Such a finding would be against any plain 
reading of the text of their licenses that limits their use to television 
broadcasting.  The latter scenario (whereby the rezoning would cause 
the broadcasters to lose all rights) is far more likely because the 
weight of the evidence, particularly the usage rules surrounding 
broadcast licenses, suggests that the television broadcasters only have 
rights for television broadcasting.  Thus, if the broadcasters’ spectrum 
were rezoned for different use, the broadcasters would likely lose all 
rights to the spectrum.  But depending on how the television 
broadcasters’ rights are viewed, they may be entitled to compensation 
for their current use.  In a traditional property context, this situation 
is tantamount to a property where one party, a farmer, for example, 
sells the commercial building rights to a property while keeping the 
farming rights.  In the event the property was rezoned entirely 
residential, the farmer could lose his or her interest completely as 
only one element of the property’s use is being affected.  If a court 
took a narrow view of the farmer’s property rights, that all of his 
farming rights were lost, however, he or she could be due 
compensation.  Although the risk is low, the government may not 
want to expose itself to the possible risks (however small) of being 
forced to recognize full property rights to television broadcasters to 
use their licensed spectrum for mobile broadband.  On the other 
hand, the government would also want to avoid being forced to pay 
uncertain compensation or risk an inequitable solution for 
broadcasters. 
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An intermediate zoning option would be for the FCC to reduce 
the spectrum allocated to the broadcasters from the current 6 Mhz 
per channel.  This would be somewhat akin to a zoning ordinance that 
requires property owners to allocate some of their property for public 
use.  While reducing the spectrum allocation of each broadcaster may 
be part of an overall strategy to free spectrum for mobile broadband 
applications, it is unlikely to open up a sufficient quantity of spectrum 
for the government to meet its overall goal of reclaiming 120 Mhz of 
television broadcast spectrum.  To meet its nationwide spectrum 
goals, the government will likely have to completely eliminate some 
currently existing broadcast licenses. 
2. Timing Considerations for Zoning Changes
If the government were to pursue rezoning as a viable option to
reallocate the spectrum, it would need to determine the optimal 
timing of such action.  Traditional property law dictates that if a 
property interest (which presumably includes the broadcasters’ 
expectation of use for the duration of their license periods as well as 
any other potential property interest in the spectrum) is eliminated in 
order to confer a benefit to society, the owner is entitled to fair value 
compensation based on the prior use.  In Pennsylvania Coal,82 the 
Supreme Court ruled that regulation which effectively eliminated the 
mining rights to land was a regulatory taking requiring compensation. 
Thus, a rezoning that annulled the broadcasters’ spectrum rights 
during their license terms would also be considered a regulatory 
taking and would likely require market compensation based on the 
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, despite the lack of clear 
property rights in the spectrum license.  The broadcasters’ licenses 
provide them with a clear expectation of use of the spectrum for the 
duration of the license period.  A zoning change during the license 
period by the party who granted the license would clearly frustrate 
those expectations.  However, the broadcasters would not be entitled 
to any compensation if the FCC could successfully demonstrate that 
the rezoning was being done to prevent harm to society or eliminate a 
public nuisance.83  Specifically, the FCC would have to demonstrate 
that the current usage of the spectrum harms society as it limits the 
availability of more valuable mobile data applications.  However, this 
argument would likely fail because zoning to prevent harm is typically 
used for health and safety issues.  Limited access to mobile 
82. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
83. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870  (1970).
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broadband applications is unlikely to rise to this level.  Thus, if the 
government “rezoned” broadcasting spectrum to prohibit 
broadcasting in favor of more valuable mobile broadband use during 
the license term, the government would likely owe the broadcasters 
compensation.84  The compensation would be based on the fair 
market value for the balance of their license terms and any other 
property rights in the spectrum they may have. 
For practical purposes, the government’s desire to avoid 
protracted litigation makes a unilateral termination of broadcasters’ 
licenses prior to the expiration of their eight-year terms unlikely.  At 
the end of the license term, the government could likely rezone the 
spectrum without compensation because the broadcasters have 
relatively weak legal claims to continued property rights in the 
spectrum.85 
However, there is no guarantee that the government, even if it 
wanted to, could entirely avoid compensating the broadcasters 
through rezoning at the expiration of the license periods.  In the 
unlikely event the courts deemed the broadcasters to have property 
interests in the spectrum for broadcasting, the government would owe 
them compensation for the decline in enterprise value of their 
organizations due to the spectrum loss.  This amount is likely far 
more substantial than losses stemming from not being able to use the 
spectrum for the balance of the license period that would result from 
rezoning the spectrum before expiration.  Also, in the extremely 
unlikely (but possible) scenario that the broadcasters are ultimately 
found to have complete property rights to use spectrum for mobile 
broadband, they could be entitled to the full value of the spectrum at 
its new enhanced value for mobile broadband use.  Finally, if 
broadcasters are found to have no property rights, they will still likely 
enjoy significant due process rights.86 
As such, rezoning to reacquire the spectrum is not without legal 
and strategic risks to both the government and the broadcasters, and 
also poses significant due process challenges.  Absent political 
considerations and based solely on legal property principles, the most 
likely rezoning scenario would result in the broadcasters getting no 
compensation assuming the government waits until the end of the 
84. FCC Report 10-201, supra note 63, at 74–75.  The FCC disputes this conclusion
and argues that it has the right to modify spectrum licenses in the middle of the license 
period for the public benefit, even in the case of licenses for which the licensee has paid 
for the right to use the spectrum under specific terms. 
85. Ownership Rights, supra note 19, at Section II.
86. Id. at Section VI.
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license period.  Therefore, while neither the government nor the 
broadcasters will likely pursue rezoning as the principal method for 
reacquiring the spectrum, the FCC may use the threat of “down 
zoning” or “rezoning” as a “stick” to encourage the broadcasters to 
negotiate a more optimal settlement in good faith.  Of course, once 
spectrum is reclaimed the government would effectively rezone it 
from broadcasting to mobile broadband use.  However, rezoning 
would not be a good primary tool for the government to reclaim the 
broadcasters’ spectrum in the first place. 
B. Eminent Domain Provides a More Promising Framework for
Determining Compensation
Eminent domain, however, may be a useful traditional property
framework for fashioning an equitable solution between the FCC and 
the broadcasters.  Eminent domain allows the government to take 
private property for “public use” while compensating the owner.87  
Traditionally, eminent domain is used for building schools, roads, and 
other public works that require large plots of land where the 
government cannot afford to be “held-up” by a resisting landowner 
who could thwart the project. 
In Kelo v. City of New London,88 the Supreme Court made clear 
that eminent domain can be invoked to transfer property from one 
private party to another in order to further economic development. 
Moreover, the earlier Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit,89 decision offers the government some deference in making 
the decision.  It does not hold the government liable if the anticipated 
economic benefits do not occur as long as they are reasonably 
expected and were the major reason for the decision. 
In the case of broadcast spectrum, the government would 
similarly reallocate the spectrum from one private party (the current 
broadcasters) to other private parties (mobile wireless broadband 
providers) in order to enhance the value of the spectrum to society. 
Hence, Kelo would support the use of eminent domain to acquire the 
underutilized television broadcast spectrum and later reallocate it for 
reuse by mobile broadband providers.  Many analyses of the 
telecommunication spectrum suggest that the current use of 294 Mhz 
by the broadcasters is inefficient for society and could be much better 
87. Eminent Domain, CORNELL UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eminent_domain (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:15 PM) (defining 
eminent domain).  
88. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
89. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455  (Mich. 1981).
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used by mobile data providers.90  Poletown provides the government 
the authority to use its discretion even in the unlikely event that the 
expected benefits of increased mobile broadband spectrum do not 
come to fruition. 
C. Political Power Considerations Will Not End
While the goal of the traditional property rights/eminent domain
strategy is to minimize the political aspect of the process through an 
appeal to established law, the process will undoubtedly remain highly 
political.  Unfortunately, political will is a required part of any 
framework the government might employ.  For example, an eminent 
domain action cannot commence without the government initially 
bringing a case.  In fact, it would be very naïve to expect the 
government to adopt a straightforward eminent domain approach. 
This is because broadcasters would likely exert significant political 
pressure on government officials to avoid such an approach because it 
would deny broadcasters the premium buyout they seek. 
1. Payments to Broadcasters Likely to Be Larger Than Necessary
Ultimately, these political pressures will likely result in the
broadcasters getting a somewhat larger recovery than an eminent 
domain-type settlement because the government will need to induce 
them to support the process.  An “even trade” will probably not be 
enough to get the broadcasters’ cooperation.  This is particularly 
likely to be the case in urban areas where broadcasters are, on the 
whole, more profitable, and where the government needs the 
spectrum the most.  Broadcasters are highly organized and possess a 
great deal of political power, their stakes are high, and their interests 
are almost uniformly aligned.91 
2. Eminent Domain Can Set the Framework for Broadcaster Compensation
The existence of eminent domain as a potential solution can play
a significant role in resolving the negotiation as to the level of 
90. A partial list of these include: Richard H. Thaler, Buried Treasure in Your TV
Dial, NEW YORK TIMES (February 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/ 
business/economy/28view.html; Kim McAvoy, FCC Begins TV Spectrum Swap, 
TVNEWSCHECK, (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/2010/11/30/4736 
7/fcc-begins-tv-spectrum-revamp/page/1; OBI Technical Paper, No. 3, supra note 10 at 7; 
Bruce M. Owen, Saving Mt. Wilson—and Increasing Spectrum Efficiency, PERSPECTIVES 
FROM FSF SCHOLARS, Vol. 4, No. 18 (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.freestatefoundation. 
org/images/Saving_Mt._Wilson_-_and_Increasing_ Spectrum_Efficiency.pdf. 
91. Merrill, supra note 17, at 281 (discussing the elements that influence a group’s
power under a distributional theory). 
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compensation, if any, the government will owe the broadcasters to 
clear the spectrum for mobile broadband use.  A discussion of the 
government’s established right to acquire the spectrum via eminent 
domain at a small fraction of its higher mobile broadband use value 
would be a good starting point for the negotiations.  Any increased 
prominence of the eminent domain option could significantly reframe 
the discussions to the advantage of the U.S. Treasury.  On the other 
hand, discussions centered around the absolute value of the spectrum 
and the broadcasters’ alleged “ownership” of the spectrum (as 
opposed to an interest in their license for broadcasting use and the 
value of the must carry rules) would likely suggest a payout to 
broadcasters above the market value for television broadcasting use. 
One of the major factors mitigating broadcaster resistance under an 
eminent domain approach is likely to be that they would not be 
economically harmed.  Broadcasters would keep the majority of the 
value of their businesses and get a market-based buyout for the 
remainder.  The fact that they would not be harmed combined with 
the threat of downzoning if they are unable to reach an agreement 
could significantly limit the cohesion of the group’s resistance as 
offers from the government begin to marginally exceed the value of 
the business they stand to lose from turning over their broadcast 
licenses.  Moreover, the simplicity of this option and the fact this 
method is generally accepted in U.S. law may also help to accelerate 
the pace of discussions as they could be framed around a concrete, 
well-established legal model as opposed to attempting to get 
consensus for a new alternative legal framework. 
VI. Valuation Advantages of
Traditional Property Law Approach 
A critical principle of compensation for eminent domain and 
rezoning actions is that any compensation payment is based on the 
fair market value of the property at the time of the taking, based on 
its use, at that time.  This principle was established by United States v. 
Cors,92 where the Court ruled that compensation to the owner of a 
tugboat that was requisitioned by the government during World War 
II could not include the appreciation of the value in the tugboat 
created by the government’s increased wartime demand.  In Cors, the 
Court said: “[t]hat is a value which the government itself created and 
hence in fairness should not be required to pay.”93  Assuming the 
92. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
93. Cors, 337 U.S. at 334.
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government concedes property rights to broadcasters, any FCC 
broadcasting licenses that are not renewed would be analogous to 
condemned property in a traditional eminent domain action.  As with 
the tugboat owner in Cors, the television broadcasting license owners 
would not be entitled to any surplus that might come from any new, 
and potentially more lucrative, use by the government such as mobile 
broadband applications.  Valuation would instead be based on the 
current use for broadcasting. 
A. Broadcast Spectrum Valuations are Affordable
As mentioned previously, the television broadcast industry is, as a
whole, likely worth between $60 billion and $65 billion based on 
recent estimates.94 Although the government seeks to reacquire 
approximately 40.8% of the broadcasters’ spectrum (120Mhz of their 
294 Mhz), economist Coleman Bazelon estimates the cost to the 
government of outright acquiring the broadcasters needed to clear 
120 Mhz of spectrum nationwide at $15.2 billion at auction or 
approximately only 24% of the industry’s enterprise value.95  This is 
because much of the spectrum allocated for television broadcasting is 
not licensed and remains unused in many markets and thus would not 
need to be reacquired from licensees.96  Moreover, due to 
inefficiencies in Bazelon’s reverse auction proposal,97 including paying 
each bought-out broadcaster at the highest bid that is not accepted, 
and a relatively small pool of sellers in each market that can lead to 
various forms of market manipulation, an eminent domain strategy is 
likely to be achievable at somewhat lower valuations than Bazelon’s 
estimates.  A sensitivity analysis of such a buyout is shown in Exhibit 
2 below. 
However, since, approximately 10% of broadcasters’ viewership is 
over-the-air, perhaps over 90% of television broadcasters’ value lies 
not in their over-the-air transmission rights, but in their 
retransmission on cable and satellite systems.  Compensating them for 
their full enterprise value when, on average only 10% of it is 
attributable to their broadcasting activity, would result in significant 
overcompensation. 
94. Broadcast Industry Valuation, supra note 60.
95. Bazelon II, supra note 51.
96. Hazlett, supra note 12, at 5–6.
97. Bazelon II, supra note 51, at 19.  In the reverse auction, broadcasters would
submit bids for the price at which they would sell their licenses and be paid the highest bid 
that was not accepted.  This method is designed to encourage truthfulness in the bidding 
process, but is likely to increase payout prices to broadcasters above fair market value. 
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1. Maintaining Must-Carry Could Significantly Lower Reacquisition Costs
As mentioned above, most of the broadcasters’ viewership comes
from retransmission on satellite and cable systems.  Thus, if the 
government could modify the must-carry rules to give them continued 
retransmission rights after they return their spectrum, broadcaster 
compensation for the loss of their licenses would be limited to the 
value of the over-the-air viewers.  Using the 10% figure for over-the-
air viewership and a U.S. population estimate of 285 million,98 the 
proper payment to the broadcasters whose spectrum has been 
reacquired would be between $2.0 billion and $2.5 billion, including 
$1.0 billion for the cost of “repacking” the remaining spectrum 
holders close together so as to create the contiguous blocks of 
nationwide spectrum mobile broadband providers find most efficient.  
In addition to preserving the value of the broadcasters’ assets, and 
thus lowering the needed buy-out price, this approach also preserves 
the value the broadcasters bring to their communities with their 
content to the 90% of their viewers who view television over cable or 
satellite systems.  See Exhibit 3 below for a sensitivity analysis of the 
cost: 
98. Published spectrum price per Mhz/POP calculations are generally based on 285
million people in the United States even though widely accepted estimates indicate over 
309 million people in the United States.  I cannot explain this discrepancy, but use the 285 
million figure in this paper to ensure consistency with most published price/Mhz POP 
calculations.  
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2. Over-the-Air Transmission and Must-Carry Rights Becoming Less
Important to Broadcasters
Not only are 90% of television viewers served via rebroadcast
over cable and satellite not dependent on wireless spectrum, but also 
the broadcasters incur only nominal costs to reach them. 
Additionally, the “must-carry” and SHVA rules are slowly becoming 
less relevant to the broadcasting industry as a whole.  Many 
broadcasters have elected to waive such rights so as to be able to 
negotiate carriage on a fee basis with cable and satellite operators. 
The FCC estimates that only 37% of broadcasters currently rely on 
must-carry rights to gain carriage.99  The others waive these rights and 
sell their content to the cable and satellite companies for a fee.  Thus, 
the broadcasters either pay nearly nothing or actually receive 
payment for broadcasting to approximately 90% of their audience. 
The broadcasters’ cost of serving the 10% of viewers who receive 
local broadcast television over-the-air is therefore disproportionately 
high as it requires a significant investment in broadcasting 
infrastructure as well as ongoing maintenance and electricity costs.  In 
fact, given the small percentage of people who actually view over-the-
air television, and the cost associated with providing it, many 
broadcasters could actually end up being more profitable by 
abandoning over-the-air broadcasting.  Additionally, over-the-air 
99. Spectrum, supra note 7, at 8.
 
2012] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE BROADCASTING SPECTRUM 181
viewers tend to have lower incomes,100 are more likely to be over age 
65,101 and to live in rural areas102 where cable systems are less 
prevalent. These demographic characteristics make the broadcasters’ 
over-the-air viewers less attractive to advertisers than their viewers on 
cable or satellite systems.  Therefore, due to the high costs of serving 
over-the-air viewers and their unfavorable demographics for 
advertisers, the value of these 10% of viewers is likely to be much less 
than 10% of the industry’s overall value.  These trends support the 
use of conservative valuation metrics to compensate broadcasters for 
over-the-air subscribers’ losses and any loss or weakening of must-
carry rights. 
3. Over-the-Air Audience Remains Reasonable Proxy for Spectrum
Valuation
The networks, however, would likely argue that, because their
economic model depends on advertising (as opposed to subscription) 
revenue, they will no longer be able to compete for any content 
against the cable companies if they lose their over-the-air customer 
base, even though that represents only about 10% of their total 
audience.  They will argue that content companies will sell directly to 
the cable and satellite companies if the networks cannot deliver the 
incremental estimated 10% of the population that cable and satellite 
do not reach.  This is a valid concern for the broadcasters, but the 
number of over-the-air television viewers has been steadily declining 
each year.  This continuing decline is likely to be inevitable regardless 
of what happens to the spectrum.103  Moreover, television 
broadcasters have significant advantages even without spectrum. 
There is far more content produced than cable and satellite systems 
make available on their networks, particularly niche programming 
that typically has difficulty getting carriage.  Even without the 
advantage of a monopoly on the 9% to 14% of the population who 
watch television over-the-air, many content providers would likely be 
100. Mark. L. Goldstein, Director, DIGITAL BROADCAST TELEVISION TRANSITION: 
ESTIMATED COST OF SUPPORTING SET-TOP BOXES TO HELP ADVANCE THE DTV 
TRANSITION, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 4 (2005). 
101. TRANSITION IN TROUBLE: ACTION NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL
DIGITAL TELEVISION TRANSITION, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 12 
(2008) [hereinafter Civil Rights]. 
102. Watson, supra note 53.
103. Since 2005, broadcast TV station revenues have declined by 26%, and overall
industry employment has declined as well.  Spectrum, supra note 7, at 14 (citing Press 
Release, BIA/Kelsey Expects TV Station Revenues to End Year Lower Than Anticipated; 
Levels Last Seen in 1990s Predicted Through 2013 (Dec. 22, 2009)). 
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eager to sell to broadcasters to ensure they are carried, via 
retransmission, on certain cable and satellite systems. Additionally, 
many of the local broadcasters add value by producing their own local 
content (particularly local news) over which they often effectively 
(but not legally) have a monopoly and which advertisers, viewers and 
cable systems find desirable. 
The advantages to broadcasters of eliminating the expense of 
broadcasting is likely to somewhat offset the possible disadvantages 
of losing a monopoly serving the over-the-air viewers.  Hence, the 
percentage of viewing audience that receives the broadcasts over-the-
air is likely to be a reasonable proxy for the value of the broadcasting 
licenses.  FCC economists, however, could adjust this estimate as 
considerations of economic equity might dictate.104 
B. Higher Value for Mobile Broadband Usage Benefits U.S. Treasury
Mobile broadband spectrum is much more valuable than
broadcasting spectrum.  It has sold for as much as $1.36 Mhz/pop.105  
On the surface, this differential could provide $46.5 billion106 in gross 
revenue to the federal government if it were to re-auction 120 Mhz of 
the television broadcasters’ 294 Mhz of spectrum for mobile 
broadband use. This sum dwarfs the roughly $3.4 billion to $6.4 
billion the government would need to provide affected over-the-air 
viewers with subsidized cable or satellite television service and also to 
compensate the broadcasters for the loss of value when invoking 
eminent domain on the broadcasters and to repack the remaining 
broadcasters and also to subsidize cable and satellite subscriptions for 
affected viewers (see Exhibit 1 in Section II.C.3 and Exhibit 3 in 
Section V.A.1). 
However the economic reality is that some elasticity of demand 
will occur as additional spectrum is auctioned, particularly large 
104. Attempting to define the precise value of a broadcaster’s spectrum licenses in
relation to its overall enterprise value is beyond the scope of the paper—that project is 
best left to FCC economists—however, the percentage of overall viewers is likely to be a 
rough working proxy.  Spectrum, supra note 7, at n.87.  
105. Average price per Mhz/POP from the FCC’s March 2008 700 Mhz license in
which $19.12 billion was bid for 52 Mhz (excluding the D block as the bid did not meet the 
minimum reserve bid) covering 285 million people or $1.29 per Mhz/POP.  If one also 
excludes the E band which sold at $0.74 per Mhz/POP, arguably discounted as it was 
auctioned as less desirable “unpaired” spectrum, the price would have been $1.36 per 
Mhz/Pop.  Auction 73: 700 MHz Band, FCC, available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/ 
default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=73, (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
106. The calculation is: $1.36 Mhz/POP * 285 million people in US * 120 Mhz
auctioned = $46.512 billion.  
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amounts such as 120 Mhz.107  Each incremental slice of spectrum will 
sell for less than the amount received for the prior amount of 
spectrum.  The market is also quite fluid and much will depend on the 
financial conditions of the likely bidders at the time of the auctions, 
their access to capital, and the exact state of the projections for 
broadband growth.  On one hand, the recent success of the iPhone 4, 
the iPad 2 the Android-based smart phones, and the general growth 
in mobile broadband applications, would indicate greater demand for 
wireless broadband and a higher price.  On the other hand, the recent 
economic downturn could reduce demand and push bidding lower.  In 
this context, an initial price projection of $1.20 to $1.40 per Mhz/POP 
with an elasticity of demand of between -1.1 to -1.3 seems reasonable 
and in line with other estimates.108 The elasticity indicates that a 1.1% 
to 1.3% increase in quantity will result in a 1.0% decrease in price for 
spectrum.  This implies than an auction of 120 Mhz would yield an 
average price of $1.02 and $1.22 Mhz/POP raising $34.9 billion to 41.7 
billion. (See Exhibit 4 of a sensitivity analysis of potential revenue per 
Mhz/POP raised under different initial price and elasticity of demand 
assumptions and see Exhibit 5 for an analysis of amounts that could 
be raised by an auction of various sizes and price per Mhz/POP 
assumptions). Under any reasonable assumption, however, an 
eminent domain solution would provide significant additional funds 
well beyond the $3.4 to $6.4 billion needed to compensate 
broadcasters and viewers. 
107. Although the National Broadband Plan recommends an auction of only 120 Mhz
of television spectrum to reach its initial target of increasing broadband spectrum 300 Mhz 
in five years the FCC has not yet determined the size and timing of the auction 
process(es). 
108. Bazelon I, supra note 60, at 5.  Economist Coleman Bazelon suggests a base value
of $1.00 and an elasticity of demand of -1.2.  Given the recent success of the wireless 
broadband products and services and the partial stock market recovery since his October 
2009 article, a base value of $1.30 seems reasonable.  However, economic conditions could 
vary widely between now and any future auction date. 
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Exhibit 4.
Net Price per Mhz/POP vs. Elasticty of Demand & Initial Price Assumptions
$1.02 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4
$1.60 $1.34 $1.36 $1.38 $1.39 $1.41
$1.55 $1.30 $1.32 $1.34 $1.35 $1.36
$1.50 $1.25 $1.27 $1.29 $1.31 $1.32
$1.45 $1.21 $1.23 $1.25 $1.26 $1.28
$1.40 $1.17 $1.19 $1.21 $1.22 $1.23
$1.35 $1.13 $1.15 $1.16 $1.18 $1.19
$1.30 $1.09 $1.10 $1.12 $1.13 $1.14
$1.25 $1.05 $1.06 $1.08 $1.09 $1.10
$1.20 $1.00 $1.02 $1.03 $1.05 $1.06
$1.15 $0.96 $0.98 $0.99 $1.00 $1.01
$1.10 $0.92 $0.93 $0.95 $0.96 $0.97
$1.05 $0.88 $0.89 $0.90 $0.91 $0.92
$1.00 $0.84 $0.85 $0.86 $0.87 $0.88

















This solution, based on traditional property rights principles, 
would enable the government to “recapture” the spectrum at a small 
fraction of the $1.02–$1.22 Mhz/POP it could get for the spectrum if 
reauctioned for mobile broadband.  The difference could yield a 
profit to the U.S. Treasury of approximately $28.5 billion to $38.3 
billion after paying $3.4 billion to $6.4 billion to provide affected 
viewers with a subsidized alternative and to compensate the 
broadcasters if 120 Mhz is auctioned.  See Exhibit 6 below for a 
breakdown of this analysis. 
 Although the National Broadband Plan recommends initially 
reallocating only 120 Mhz109 of broadcasting spectrum, it is possible 
the auction of television spectrum could be combined with auctions of 
other spectrum to reach the FCC’s goal of 500 Mhz for mobile 
broadband services by 2020.  This would increase the auction size and 
the impact of the elasticity of demand.  Alternatively, the government 
109. Spectrum, supra note 7, at 2.
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may divide the auction into multiple smaller ones that could reduce 
such impact.  The eminent domain solution could be also used as a 
principled solution for the government to reclaim additional 
television broadcast spectrum in the future. 
VII. Conclusion: All Roads Lead to an
Eminent Domain Framework
The government must determine an effective strategy for 
reallocating spectrum in order to make broadband more readily 
available and also generate significant revenue for the U.S. Treasury. 
The challenge is to find a reasonable and efficient mechanism for 
removing the television broadcasters from the spectrum.  For political 
and strategic reasons, the government has effectively conceded 
certain property rights to the television broadcasters through its 
statements that it will rely on a “voluntary” transition process to 
reclaim its television broadcasting spectrum and reallocate it for 
mobile broadband use. The government needs to implement a 
solution that appears “fair” to television broadcasters and also 
ensures large blocks of contiguous spectrum for mobile broadband 
and does not waste government assets.  The only solution that meets 
all of these needs is a buyout of the broadcasters at the market value 
of their spectrum assets—a price that can be reduced through 
continued must-carry privileges and other options.  Given that the 
government has effectively conceded (or has decided to act as though 
it is conceding) certain property rights, an eminent domain and 
zoning model is a convenient and tested framework to effect such a 
solution.  Nevertheless, the government’s ability to curtail the 
broadcasters’ spectrum rights by “down zoning” their licenses would 
provide a meaningful threat (the “stick”) to encourage the television 
broadcasters to accept a fair market offer from the government (the 
“carrot”). 
The television broadcasters are a politically powerful group. 
They are certain to resist any transaction that does not yield a 
substantial premium for them despite the lack of a convincing 
argument that they are entitled to any property rights after their 
current licenses expire.  A politically influenced payment that slightly 
exceeds fair market value may be the most expeditious solution to 
moving the television broadcasters off the spectrum to make room for 
the higher value mobile broadband applications, which will ultimately 
benefit society as a whole.  This result would further the societal goals 
of obtaining more readily available broadband and generating 
revenue for the U.S. government while placating the potential 
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concerns of the broadcasters and viewers. Moreover, it would enable 
the government to avoid probable prolonged litigation over property 
rights, and preserve incentives for communications providers to invest 
in FCC licenses and build out new services. 
Longer term, however, the government needs to think about how 
to avoid situations where it is forced to buy back its own assets which 
it previously had not sold or intentionally given away. 
